Analysis: The impoverishment, open fronts and displacement of Turkey



By Giorgos Kofinakos While the Turkish currency continues to fall steadily, having lost more than 42% against the dollar since the beginning of the year, Erdogan’s decision to place the third Central Banker in the last 1.5 years follows. Apparently, it is not only the Central Banker and the Minister of Finance who are to blame for the fall of the Turkish Pound, the increase of informal inflation and unemployment to levels above 30% and by Turkish people, but Erdogan’s obsession with a paradoxical policy of low interest rates while inflation is running at five times the rate. According to this survey, 16 million people in Turkey are poor and 18 million live on the brink of poverty. A total of 34 million people, or more than 42% of the population, face the threat of starvation. The size of these numbers reflects the weakness of the Erdogan government’s economic policies and its oligarchy to meet the needs of its people. Inevitably, Erdogan’s popularity has plummeted from 53% a year ago to 39% today. The complicated Russia-Turkey relationship In an effort to maintain control, it has imposed a policy on Turkey managing its economic decline at home with distraction: the projection of power abroad. It is a similar policy to that of Turkey’s friend / adversary in the Black Sea, Russia. Here we come to the complicated Russia-Turkey relationship: While everyone’s attention has been focused on the US election in recent weeks, much has happened on the open fronts between Russia and Turkey. The way in which Russia and Turkey coexist has implications for the Middle East and North Africa as a whole, precisely because they are on opposite sides of so many conflicts and because they are located in one of the most geopolitically strategic neighborhoods in the world. important for energy supply from Russia, the Caucasus and further east to Europe. Just this week, Russian airstrikes in Syria killed more than 80 and wounded more than 130 Syrian fighters (a friend of those close to Turkey). Erdogan, who has been very talkative on other occasions, has not spoken about this fact. It is impressive that, shortly afterwards, Turkish forces withdrew from 9 outposts near the Syrian city of Idlib. The irony is that, that week, Putin said he greatly appreciated Erdogan’s flexibility, while at the same time the Russian Foreign Minister, shortly before his visit to Greece, said that Turkey is not considered a strategic partner of Russia. This “one on the nail and one on the horseshoe” policy is used by Russia to remind Turkey of its limits, but at the same time to keep it on an exit trajectory from the dependence of the West and NATO. Many wonder why Putin did not ask Erdogan then for Turkey to withdraw from the Nagorno-Karabakh war? Because Putin restrains his genuine dissatisfaction with Turkey’s intervention as part of a strategic punishment for Armenian Prime Minister Nicole Pasinian and his government, which opposes Armenia’s return to Russia’s sphere of influence. battles in the Caucasus took a bad turn for Armenia, it handed over to this country an electronic warfare system (by the way, such a system would be of great interest for acquisition by Greece), which shot down within 9 days 9 Turkish unmanned Bayraktar IDs. With these moves, Putin is showing Turkey what it should consider as its borders in the Caucasus region. A Russian analyst recently said: “Although the red line between Russia and Turkey has not yet been crossed, Erdogan is pushing Putin’s nerve endings.” However, despite the difficult times over the years, Turkey and Russia have managed to maintain at least one communicative relationship. At the same time, Turkish support for Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups throughout the Middle East and North Africa continues unabated, effectively destroying Ankara’s relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, the UAE and other countries in the region. As for Turkey’s differences with EU countries such as France, Greece and Cyprus, at least in the latter two, one would expect the EU to vigorously clarify what the borders are. and its limits to third parties. Instead, we have an insane attempt by Berlin to act as an independent observer between the two sides, at a time when one of them is part of the EU. If Mexico had ever made claims on California soil and sent seismic research vessels into its waters, Would it make sense for the United States government to mediate in the warring parties? Obviously, any such approach is ridiculous. The EU has a common foreign policy, and without common borders with its member states, there is no EU. Berlin makes the EU’s foreign policy look like that of supranational organizations like the Red Cross, in contrast to the role assigned to it by its members and recognized by the international community. The EU has interests and borders. And in the event of a confrontation between Turkey and France, Greece and Cyprus, the EU must recognize that it is one of the two parties and start acting appropriately to defend these interests. In other words , on the one hand Turkey faces Russia vis-Συ-vis Syria, Libya and the Caucasus, while on the other hand it is locked in deep confrontation with Europe, Middle Eastern countries, but also the USA, due to the purchase of S-400 . Meanwhile, the economy and its currency face an almost insurmountable challenge. With the addition of COVID-19 we end up with a really explosive mix. In a short time, Turkey may find itself too exposed and isolated. At some point, possibly soon, either the Turkish people will blame Erdogan for what happened and find a way to oust him, or Turkey will find that it has become a very weak pariah state (in the case of Iran). Or both. George Kofinakos, CEO of StormHarbour London and Visiting Professor at Rutgers University USAPRODUCTION STEPFollow it on Google News and be the first to know all the newsSee all the latest News from Greece and the World, at



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